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The Transnational Legal Ordering of the 
Death Penalty 
Stefanie Neumeier and Wayne Sandholtz
A transnational legal order (TLO) authoritatively shapes “the 
understanding and practice of law” in a specific area of social activity, 
involving both state and civil society actors, and linking national, regional, 
and international levels. We argue that a TLO has emerged and settled 
since 1945 around capital punishment. Our analysis of the death penalty 
TLO treats “bottom-up” and “top-down” effects as interconnected, 
addresses the creation of legal order at both national and international levels, 
and emphasizes the recursivity linking developments at both levels. We trace 
the development of death penalty abolition from its origins in the immediate 
aftermath of World War II. Because the practical effects of abolition—in 
shaping legal and penal practice—necessarily occur at the national level, the 
analysis focuses on the international, transnational, and domestic factors 
that lead states to end capital punishment. After describing the emergence of 
a TLO abolishing the death penalty, we offer a new way of measuring the 
global and country-specific activities of transnational advocacy groups 
(Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International). We incorporate that 
measure in an analysis of data from about 150 countries. The central 
hypothesis is that making the TLO on capital punishment effective through 
abolition in national law requires modes of political action that overcome 
majoritarian public support for retention. We suggest two domestic 
institutional features that make abolition more likely despite retentionist 
popular opinion: proportional representation in the legislature and 
independent courts. We also suggest that transnational non-governmental 
organizations (NGO) and some regional organizations can support the 
move to abolish. The data analysis is largely consistent with these 
propositions and brief case studies illustrate the principal mechanisms. 
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A transnational legal order (TLO) has emerged since 1945 around capital 
punishment. The TLO is clearly transnational: as of 2017, 105 countries had abolished 
the death penalty for all crimes. A further eight countries had prohibited it for 
ordinary crimes, and forty-six had abolished it de facto (by not carrying out any 
executions for at least ten years).1 The death penalty TLO is also legal, at both the 
national and international levels. In national law, the prohibition on the death 
penalty can be written into the constitution itself, established by judicial 
interpretation, or implemented via legislation. At the international level, core human 
rights treaties do not prohibit the death penalty, but rather envision its “progressive 
restriction.”2 And the death penalty is explicitly excluded as a punishment in the 
international criminal tribunals established in the 1990s and since.3 Regional treaties, 
including the Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish 
the Death Penalty, and especially Protocol No. 6 and Protocol No. 13 to the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), aim directly at its abolition. 
Finally, the interconnected domestic, international, and regional legal rules related 
to capital punishment constitute an order: they authoritatively shape “the 
understanding and practice of law” in a specific area of social activity.4
The death penalty TLO differs from TLOs that have emerged in other areas 
of criminal justice, in which the objective is to regulate criminal activity that crosses 
borders. TLOs for money laundering, the financing of terrorism, human trafficking, 
or drug smuggling, for example, fit that mold. But TLOs can also regulate activities 
1 Data compiled by the authors. 
2 ROGER HOOD & CAROLYN HOYLE, THE DEATH PENALTY: A WORLDWIDE PERSPECTIVE 26 (5th 
ed. 2015). 
3 Including the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda, and the International Criminal Court. 
4 Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Legal Orders, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL
ORDERS 3, 5, 20 (Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer eds., 2015). 
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that are essentially national or local, like prison conditions or the death penalty, 
which is the focus of this Article. Addressing the punishment end of the criminal 
justice spectrum, this study directly addresses several themes that are central to the 
TLO framework, including normative settlement, concordance, institutionalization, 
and recursivity.5 We seek to show that the death penalty TLO has attained partial 
normative settling, uneven concordance, and patchy institutionalization. The 
explanation for this set of mixed outcomes builds on the insight that distinct TLOs 
are almost invariably interconnected. In the case of capital punishment, the key 
linkage is to the broader international human rights regime. The consolidation of 
international standards for criminal law, as well as the movement for death penalty 
abolition, were shaped by the larger post-World War II human rights movement; 
indeed, both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) delineate basic rights 
of those subject to criminal proceedings. The cause of death penalty abolition 
advanced under a banner of rights: the fundamental right to life and the right to be 
free from cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment. 
Our analysis of the death penalty TLO incorporates core features of the TLO 
framework. It assesses the creation of legal order at both national and international 
levels, and emphasizes the recursivity linking developments at both levels.6 We 
directly confront several of the questions posed in the introduction. We return to 
some of them more specifically in our conclusion, but the core of our argument is 
that the death penalty TLO has attained partial settling, concordance, and 
implementation in large part because the global human rights framing has been at 
odds with domestic framings that see the death penalty not just as congruent with 
local values, but as necessary to protect them. In fact, death penalty abolition at the 
national level has generally occurred not in response to public demands, but despite 
public support for retention. Calls for restoring the death penalty arise now, as they 
have in the past, even in states that have long since abolished it. A key puzzle is 
therefore how the death penalty TLO has been able to achieve substantial settling 
and partial concordance in the face of general public opposition. 
The story at the global and regional levels is relatively straightforward: treaties 
limiting or abolishing the death penalty were agreed upon by political elites who 
worked at one remove, at least, from mass political opinion. However, and 
importantly, abolition of the death penalty has practical effect only at the domestic 
level, which is also where the primary puzzle resides. The core of our analysis 
therefore examines abolition in domestic law, where we confront the question of 
how abolition can occur domestically when publics almost universally favor 
retention. We argue that specific types of domestic institutions can make non-
majoritarian policy-making more likely, specifically: (1) legislatures with 
proportional representation and (2) courts that are independent of the political 
5 See id.
6 See id. at 3, 5. 
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branches. These institutions make more likely, respectively, abolition through 
legislation and abolition via judicial decision. We additionally hypothesize that 
transnational influences can enhance the likelihood of abolition, in particular: (1) 
the incentive of membership in regional organizations, and (2) the persuasive and 
socializing influence of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs). 
We offer a novel means of measuring INGO influence and incorporate it in the 
analysis of data from about 150 countries. 
The first two sections describe the death penalty TLO and the broad outlines 
of its emergence at both national and international levels. The third section presents 
our data and analysis of abolition in national law. A fourth section offers brief case 
studies to illustrate the mechanisms highlighted by the broader analysis, including 
instances of both abolishers and non-abolishers. In the conclusion, we return to the 
broader questions posed by the overall project. 
I. ABOLITION: THE BIG PICTURE
Punishment by death has existed since antiquity and is still seen in some parts 
of the world as a natural, or even necessary, part of penal law. The death penalty 
served simultaneously as a public spectacle, an exemplar of the wages of crime (or 
of sin), and a tool of social control and repression.7 Enlightenment thinkers sought 
to demolish the assumptions and myths that accumulated over the centuries 
surrounding capital punishment.8 Cesare Beccaria argued that punishment, instead 
of seeking to terrorize the populace into compliance with the laws, should be 
proportionate to the nature of the offense. He contended that capital punishment 
had no place in a modern society because it was inhumane and ineffective.9
The first laws to abolish capital punishment were enacted in U.S. states, 
perhaps ironically, given the continued retention of the death penalty in the United 
States. Pennsylvania in 1794 abolished it for all crimes except premeditated murder; 
Michigan became the first state to abolish the death penalty for murder in 1846.10
A few countries banned capital punishment for peacetime offenses in the nineteenth 
century and early twentieth century (though some would later reinstate it for periods 
of time). These were clustered in Europe (Portugal, San Marino, the Netherlands, 
Italy, Austria, Romania, and Switzerland) and Latin America (Venezuela, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, and Uruguay). The Latin American countries banned the death penalty 
for all crimes, in peacetime and in war. The Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, 
Iceland, Norway, and Sweden) abolished the death penalty for ordinary crimes 
(excluding treason and certain wartime offenses) in the first decades of the twentieth 
century.11 After World War II, a global movement to ban capital punishment 
7 See HOOD & HOYLE, supra note 2, at 10. 
8 See, e.g. Cesare Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishements, in ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS AND OTHER
WRITINGS 1, 52 (Aaron Thomas ed., Aaron Thomas & Jeremy Parzen trans., 2008). 
9  See id.
10See HOOD & HOYLE, supra note 2, at 12–13. 
11See id. at 13. 
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developed, aiming to prohibit its use under both national and international law. As 
Figure 1 shows, the majority of legislative acts abolishing the death penalty have 
occurred since about 1950. 
Figure 1 
Source: Abolition year data from Hood and Hoyle (2015) and Amnesty 
International Annual Reports 
Of course, states can abolish capital punishment through various legal means: 
by constitutional enactment or amendment, by judicial interpretation, and by 
legislation. Abolition of the death penalty in constitutions has, like abolition overall, 
taken off after World War II. Figure 2 displays the cumulative number of 
constitutions that abolish the death penalty, based on data from the Comparative 
Constitutions Project.12 Constitutions written after 1945 were framed in the era of 
global human rights and were overwhelmingly shaped by the rights-based “new 
constitutionalism.”
12 See Zachary Elkins et al., Characteristics of National Constitutions, Version 2.0 (2014), 
http://www.comparativeconstitutionsproject.org. Accessed 28 December 2016.
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Figure 2 
As the preceding figures show, the momentum for abolition gathered after 
World War II and peaked in the 1990s and in the first decade of the twenty-first 
century (Table 1). Figure 3 depicts the global situation as of 2017. “De facto 
abolition” refers to countries that retain capital punishment in the law but that have 
not carried out an execution in the previous ten years. Some of those states have 
announced moratoria on executions or an intention to halt them entirely.13
13 See HOOD & HOYLE, supra note 2 at 75–147. Examples of de facto states which have announced 
moratoria or intention to halt executions include Tunisia, Morroco, Algeria, Tanzania, Kenya, Ghana, 
Papua New Guinea, Maldives, South Korea, etc.
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Figure 3 
Finally, the extent of abolition varies dramatically across regions. Figure 4 







Before 1950s 9 9 18
1950s 1 2 3
1960s 4 4 8
1970s 10 6 16
1980s 14 4 18
1990s 35 6 41
2000–2009 23 4 27
2010–2017 9 2 11
Total 105 37 142
Note: a number of states first abolished for ordinary crimes and later 
for all crimes; the table counts both. The overall total is greater than the 
sum of abolitionist countries as of 2017 because some states appear 
twice, once in the column for all crimes and once in the column for 
ordinary crimes.
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depicts the regional picture as of 2017. Note that all Western European countries 
have abolished the death penalty for all crimes, as have most post-Soviet states and 
the countries of Oceania (Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Island states). In 
contrast, abolition has made little headway in Asia and the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA), where more than half of states retain the death penalty. 
Figure 4
II. ABOLITION AND LEGAL ORDERING: INTERNATIONAL
The construction of the death penalty TLO proceeded in parallel at the 
domestic and international levels, with both processes drawing force from the 
emerging global human rights movement. We begin with the international level 
because the global development of human rights exercised a powerful influence on 
the incorporation of human rights in domestic law, especially during the waves of 
democratization that swept the globe from the 1980s to the early 2000s. For 
instance, empirical research has clearly demonstrated the influence of international 
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instruments like the UDHR and the core international human rights treaties on the 
incorporation of human rights in national constitutions.14 The international 
movement to build global human rights norms started even before World War II 
ended, so we begin with a historical sketch of the transnational movement to end 
capital punishment. 
A. Global Ordering 
Though a number of countries abolished capital punishment in the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries,15 a genuine transnational drive to prohibit executions 
began only after World War II. The campaign to abolish the death penalty was, in 
large part, a reaction to the horrible excesses that had occurred during the war. 
Fascist regimes had used widespread executions—judicial and extrajudicial—as a 
tool of political repression. The Nazi Reich, for example, had issued “some 16,500 
death sentences.”16 Thus, the “right to life” language that appeared in post-World 
War II international human rights documents was aimed at the death penalty. The 
drafting of those documents began shortly after peace was achieved. The U.N. 
Economic and Social Council created the Commission on Human Rights in June 
1946 and charged it with preparing an International Bill of Rights. Its drafting 
committee produced the text of the UDHR, which was adopted by the United 
Nations General Assembly on December 10, 1948.17 The UDHR declares in Article 
3: “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.”18 As Schabas 
relates, in the discussions that accompanied the drafting of the UDHR, the right to 
life provision triggered debate on two issues: abortion and the death penalty. Some 
participants favored recognizing capital punishment as an exception to the right to 
life, whereas others advocated an explicit ban on the death penalty. In the end, a 
compromise emerged, in which the UDHR affirmed the right to life without 
qualification and omitted any statement for or against the death penalty.19
The UDHR was a statement of common aspirations, but its authors were 
simultaneously beginning work on a document that would take the form of a 
binding convention, namely, the ICCPR. The UN Commission on Human Rights 
14 See, e.g. David Sloss & Wayne Sandholtz, Universal Human Rights and Constitutional Change (2018); 
Colin J. Beck et al., Constitutions in World Society: A New Measure of Human Rights (Feb. 2017), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2906946; Mila Versteeg, Law versus Norms: The Impact of Human Rights Treaties 
on National Bills of Rights, 171 J. OF INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECON. 87 (2015); Zachary 
Elkins et al., Getting to Rights: Treaty Ratification, Constitutional Convergence, and Human Rights Practice, 54 
HARVARD INT’L L. J. 61 (2013); David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Evolution and Ideology of Global 
Constitutionalism, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1163 (2011). 
15 Data compiled by the authors. 
16 RICHARD J. EVANS, RITUALS OF RETRIBUTION: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN GERMANY 1600–1987,
at 795 (1996). 
17 See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
25–39 (1997). 
18 G.A. Res. 217 A (III), Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 3 (Dec. 10, 1948). 
19 WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 25–
39 (2002). 
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worked from 1947 to 1954 on drafting a covenant, the early versions of which 
treated the death penalty as an exception to the right to life. The draft of the ICCPR 
approved by the Commission on Human Rights in 1954 went before the General 
Assembly, which turned it over to its Third Committee for continued refinement. 
The provision that occupied the greatest share of the Third Committee’s time 
concerned the right to life, particularly capital punishment.20 The Third Committee 
reached agreement on what would become Article 6 of the ICCPR in 1957.21
During the debates in the Third Committee, Uruguay proposed a text that 
would have prohibited the death penalty in absolute terms. Colombia, Finland, 
Panama, Peru, and Ecuador spoke in favor. A number of other states endorsed 
abolition in principle, but judged that its inclusion in the convention would be overly 
ambitious and would make it difficult for some states to accept the treaty. France 
proposed wording that would commit states only to move toward the abolition of 
capital punishment, an idea that garnered substantial support. A number of states 
opposed the French suggestion, though none offered an explicit defense of capital 
punishment. The Committee eventually passed compromise language and entered 
Article 6 as paragraphs 2 and 6.22 In the Third Committee, Article 6 passed with 
fifty-five votes in favor, none opposed, and seventeen abstentions; that article 
underwent no subsequent revision before the adoption of the Covenant by the 
General Assembly in 1966.23 The relevant parts of Article 6 read as follows: 
1. Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be 
protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life. 
2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of 
death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with 
the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime and not 
contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant and to the Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty 
can only be carried out pursuant to a final judgement rendered by a 
competent court. . . . 
4. Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek pardon or 
commutation of the sentence. Amnesty, pardon or commutation of the 
sentence of death may be granted in all cases. 
5. Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons 
below eighteen years of age and shall not be carried out on pregnant 
women.
6. Nothing in this article shall be invoked to delay or to prevent the 
abolition of capital punishment by any State Party to the present 
Covenant.24
20 See id. at 4546.
21 See id. at 44, 48. 
22 See id. at 6264.
23 See id. at 6870, 80. 
24 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6, Mar. 23, 1976, S. Exec. Doc. No. E, 95-
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In addition, Article 4 prohibits any derogation from Article 6, even in “time 
of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation.”25 Article 4 thus forbids 
states from compromising the procedural safeguards that must accompany 
imposition of the death penalty (Art. 6(2) and 6(4)) or the prohibition on applying 
it to specific categories of persons (Art. 6(5)), even during the most critical national 
emergencies. In other words, the ICCPR signaled that the direction of development 
of human rights law was to the “progressive restriction” of capital punishment.26
In 1980, a set of Latin American and European countries introduced in the 
General Assembly a draft Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR.27 The Protocol 
would both require abolition of the death penalty and prohibit its reintroduction by 
any state that abolished it. The General Assembly passed a decision to continue 
work on the proposal, though a number of states declared that they would have 
voted against an actual protocol. Work continued over the subsequent years, and by 
1989, the General Assembly had a draft before it. The Second Optional Protocol to 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Aiming at the Abolition of 
the Death Penalty (Second Optional Protocol) passed in the General Assembly in 
December 1989; fifty-nine states voted in favor, twenty-six against, and forty-eight 
abstained.28 The key provisions appear in Article 1: 
1. No one within the jurisdiction of a State Party to the present Protocol 
shall be executed. 
2. Each State Party shall take all necessary measures to abolish the death 
penalty within its jurisdiction. 
The Second Optional Protocol also prohibits any reservations except for those 
that retain the death penalty for serious military crimes in wartime (Art. 2) and 
renews the ICCPR’s ban on derogations (Art. 6). As of May 2018, eighty-five states 
were parties to the Second Optional Protocol and another two had signed the 
Protocol but had not ratified it.29
B. Regional Ordering 
The international movement to end capital punishment also has a powerful 
regional dimension. Regional bodies in Europe and Latin America began preparing 
their own international human rights instruments in parallel with the United Nations 
in the late 1940s. Regional organizations can create various incentives for states to 
abolish the death penalty. The most powerful such incentive is almost certainly the 
one implemented in Europe, where both the Council of Europe (COE) and the 
2, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
25 Id. art. 4. 
26 HOOD & HOYLE, supra note 2. 
27 The sponsors were Austria, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Italy, Portugal, and Sweden. 
28 See SCHABAS, supra note 17, at 168175.
29 See Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aiming at 
the abolition of the death penalty, December 15, 1989, https://treaties.un.org/doc/ 
Treaties/1991/07/19910711%2007-32%20AM/Ch_IV_12p.pdf.
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European Union (EU) have actively promoted death penalty abolition. Hood goes 
so far as to argue that, though multiple causes are responsible for the spread of 
abolition, none is as “vital as the political influence and pressure exerted by 
European political institutions.”30 Regional institutional incentives had an effect on 
abolition, especially among the Central and Eastern European countries that 
democratized after 1990. 
Following the example of the United Nations, the Ninth International 
Conference of American States (1948) envisioned a general declaration to be 
followed by a more specific and binding convention. The resulting 1948 American 
Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man (ADRDM) thus included in Article 1 
a statement that “every human being has the right to life,” but made no mention of 
the death penalty. Respect for the right to life provision in Article 1 of the ADRDM 
became obligatory with the 1967 amendments to the Charter of the Organization 
of American States.31
A special Inter-American Conference in 1969 considered a draft American 
Convention on Human Rights (ACHR). Though several states favored an all-out 
ban on capital punishment, the final text contained a number of restrictions on the 
death penalty, without prohibiting it. The ACHR was signed in November 1969 and 
entered into effect in July 1978. Fourteen out of nineteen national delegations issued 
a declaration of their “firm hope of seeing the application of the death penalty 
eradicated from the American environment” and called for an additional protocol, 
which would finalize the unconditional abolition of the death penalty.32 The ACHR
follows the lead of the ICCPR in limiting the application of the death penalty and 
pointing toward abolition, but it is more restrictive than the U.N. document. For 
instance, under Article 4(2), the death penalty may “not be extended to crimes to 
which it does not presently apply.”33 Furthermore, states that have abolished the 
death penalty may not reinstate it (Art. 4(3)).34 The ACHR also expands the 
categories of persons to whom the death penalty cannot be applied to include those 
over seventy years of age (Art. 4(5)), and it prohibits capital punishment for 
“political offenses” (Art. 4(4)). 
In the mid-1980s, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, created 
by the ACHR, became concerned with the extension of the death penalty to new 
crimes in some states. At the urging of Uruguay, the Commission proposed in 1987 
a protocol to the ACHR to ban the death penalty. Only four of the nineteen states 
parties to the convention had retained capital punishment, and in June 1990, the 
Organization of American States (OAS) General Assembly approved the optional 
30ROGER HOOD, THE DEATH PENALTY: A WORLDWIDE PERSPECTIVE 16 (3d ed. 2002). 
31 See SCHABAS, supra note 19, at 312–15. 
32 See id. at 32632.
33 Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (Dept. of Int. Legal Affairs 2006 ed.). 
34 See id.
136 UCI JRNL. OF INT’L, TRANSNATIONAL, & COMP. L. [Vol.  4:124] 
protocol (ACHR Protocol).35 Whereas the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR 
requires states to take legislative action to abolish capital punishment, the ACHR 
Protocol abolishes the death penalty directly: “the States Parties to this Protocol 
shall not apply the death penalty in their territory to any person subject to their 
jurisdiction.”36 The ACHR Protocol, like the Second Optional Protocol, allows 
states to enter reservations with respect to capital punishment during wartime, 
though it restricts its application to “extremely serious crimes of a military nature” 
and “in accordance with international law” (Art. 2(1)). Thirteen states are parties to 
the ACHR Protocol.37
The abolition movement in Europe has been even more far-reaching than that 
of Latin America, at least in terms of the number of countries affected. Western 
European countries were among the first to prohibit capital punishment.38 A 
number of them, including Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, 
Denmark, Spain, Portugal, and Italy, were leading promoters of abolition in the UN 
and sponsored (along with a number of Latin American states) many of the General 
Assembly resolutions on the subject.39 International institutions in Europe reflected 
the abolitionist commitments of a growing number of European states. For 
instance, the COE’s European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the first 
general international human rights treaty, defines capital punishment as an 
exception to the right to life.40 By the 1980s, most member states of the COE had 
abolished capital punishment in national law. 
In order to bring the ECHR up to date with respect to European practice, the 
COE prepared Protocol No. 6 to the ECHR, which twelve states signed in April 
1983. Protocol No. 6 bans the death penalty directly: “The death penalty shall be 
abolished. No-one shall be condemned to such penalty or executed.”41 Under 
Protocol No. 6, however, states may retain capital punishment provisions for 
wartime or imminent threat of war (Art. 2). In May 2002, the COE passed Protocol 
No. 13 to the ECHR, which directly and completely abolishes the death penalty, 
with no reservations or derogations permitted.42 As of May 2018, forty-four states 
had ratified or acceded to Protocol No. 13 and one (Russia) had signed but not 
35 See SCHABAS, supra note 19, at 35053.
36 Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty, art. 1, June 
8, 1990, O.A.S.T.S. No. 73. (Dept. of Int. Legal Affairs 2006 ed.). 
37 Signatories and Ratifications, Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish 
the Death Penalty, June 8, 1990, O.A.S.T.S. No. 73. (Dept. of Int. Legal Affairs 2006 ed.). 
38 See HOOD & HOYLE, supra note 2, at 13, 49. 
39 See HOOD & HOYLE, supra note 2, at 2627; See SCHABAS, supra note 19, at 15667.
40 See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, April 11, 1950, 
C.E.T.S. No. 005, 213 U.N.T.S. 2889 (Council of Europe 2006 ed.). 
41 Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, art. 1, April 28, 1983, C.E.T.S. No. 114, 2889 U.N.T.S. 
1496.
42 See Protocol No. 13 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty in All Circumstances, art. 1–3, March 3, 2002, 
C.E.T.S. No. 187, 2889 U.N.T.S. 2246 (Council of Europe 2006 ed.). 
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ratified.43
The EU has similarly embraced death penalty abolition. Of course, all EU 
states are also members of the COE, and are therefore potential parties to Protocol 
No. 6 and Protocol No. 13. By 2000, all twenty-seven of the current EU member 
states had ratified Protocol No. 6. That same year, the EU bodies with legislative 
roles—the European Council, the European Parliament, and the Commission—all 
approved a Charter of Fundamental Rights. Article 2 of the Charter, titled “Right 
to Life,” declares, “No one shall be condemned to the death penalty, or executed.”44
The Charter was incorporated as Part II of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution 
for Europe.45
Even prior to 2000, in June 1998, the EU decided to make abolition of the 
death penalty an issue in its relations with other countries, with the objective of 
working “towards universal abolition of the death penalty as a strongly held policy 
view agreed by all member states.”46 The EU, in fact, has made démarches to a 
number of countries, including Lebanon, the Palestinian Authority, Malaysia, Sri 
Lanka, Japan, Guinea, Botswana, and the United States, on specific death penalty 
cases. The EU has issued numerous diplomatic communications to the United 
States, both regarding the death penalty in general and with respect to specific cases. 
For instance, in a May 2001 letter to the U.S. government, the EU declared that it 
was “deeply concerned about the high number of executions in the United States,” 
and it called on the government “to consider further steps towards the abolition of 
the death penalty.”47 In December 2005, the EU announced its “deep regret that, 
with the execution of Kenneth Lee Boyd by the State of North Carolina on 2 
December 2005, the US ha[d] carried out its 1,000th execution since the 
reinstatement of the death penalty in 1976.”48 Over the past several years, the EU 
has also filed amicus curiae briefs at the U.S. Supreme Court in death penalty cases, 
including Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), in which the Court determined that 
the execution of juveniles violated the U.S. Constitution. Several U.S. states have 
also been the recipients of EU communications.49 Considering that the United 
States continues to employ the death penalty, it may appear that the influence of 
43 See Chart of Signatures and Ratifications to Treaty 187, Protocol No. 13 to the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death 
Penalty in All Circumstances, March 3, 2002, C.E.T.S. No. 187, 2889 U.N.T.S. 2246 (Council of Europe 
2018 ed.). 
44 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 O.J. (C 364). 
45 See Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Part II, Dec. 16, 2004, 2004 O.J. (C 301) 47. 
46 European Union, Guidelines to EU Policy Towards Third Countries on the Death Penalty, 29 June 
1998, available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/4705f3d12.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2019). 
47 Press Release, European Union, EU Policy on the Death Penalty (May 10, 2001) (on file with author). 
48 Council of the European Union Press Release 15262/05 (Presse 341), Declaration by the Presidency 
on Behalf of the European Union on the 1,000th Execution in the US (Dec. 2, 2005). 
49 For a compilation of EU death penalty actions vis-á-vis the United States and specific U.S. states, see
EU Policy & Action on the Death Penalty: Actions on US Death Row Cases, European Union - 
Delegation of the European Commission to the USA (2006), https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ 
united-states-america/35027/death-penalty-archive_en.
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European institutions is rather limited. However, the COE and the EU have played 
a central role in promoting abolition in other countries. 
To illuminate the influence of regional institutions, we take a closer look at 
how the COE and the EU actively promoted abolition in the newly independent 
states of Central and Eastern Europe. The COE and the EU exercised considerable 
influence because the transition states were eager to consolidate their fledgling 
democracies and market economies by joining these key European institutions. 
With respect to the COE, some newly independent states abolished the death 
penalty before joining; it is difficult to assess the extent to which anticipation of 
COE membership figured among the motivations for abolition. In other cases, the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) played an active role in 
pushing for abolition. PACE did not make death penalty abolition an explicit 
requirement for the early applicants, like Hungary in 1990 or Estonia and Lithuania 
in 1993. It did, however, attach “great importance to the commitment expressed by 
the Lithuanian authorities to sign and ratify the European Convention on Human 
Rights.” The opinion on the Estonian application contained similar language.50
By the mid-1990s, the COE had made signature and ratification of Protocol 
No. 6 to the ECHR a condition of joining.51 Thus, PACE opinion on Latvia’s 
application for membership declared that Latvia had committed itself to ratifying 
the ECHR and Protocol No. 6 within a year of accession.52 The Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, Armenia, Georgia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
also agreed to one-year time frames for ratifying Protocol No. 6.53 The agreements 
with Moldova, Albania, Ukraine, Croatia, and Russia required ratification of 
Protocol No. 6 within three years of joining the COE.54 Some COE accession 
agreements obligated new members to establish an immediate moratorium on 
executions (Albania, Russia, Ukraine) or to pass legislation abolishing the death 
penalty in domestic criminal codes within one year (Armenia). 
In a few cases, when new members failed to fulfill their obligations related to 
abolition of capital punishment, PACE increased the pressure for them to comply. 
50 Eur. Parl. Ass., Report on the Application of the Republic of Lithuania for Membership of the Council of Europe,
Op. No. 168 (1993); Eur. Constul., Ass., Report on the application of the Republic of Estonia for Membership of 
the Council of Europe, Op. No. 170 (1993).
51 See Eur. Parl. Ass., Abolition of the Death Penalty in Europe ¶6, Res. 1097 (1996); Eur. Parl., Ass., Abolition 
of Capital Punishment ¶6, Res. 1044 (1994). 
52 See Eur. Parl. Ass., Report on the Application by Latvia for Membership of the Council of Europe, Op. No. 183 
(1995).
53 See Eur. Parl. Ass., The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s Application for Membership of the Council of Europe,
Op. No. 239 (2002); Eur. Parl. Ass., Armenia’s Application for Membership of the Council of Europe, Op. No. 
221 (2000); Eur. Parl. Ass., Georgia’s Application for Membership of the Council of Europe, Op. No. 209 
(1999);Eur. Parl. Ass., Application by the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia for Membership of the Council of 
Europe, Op. No. 191 (1995). 
54 See Eur. Parl. Ass., Croatia’s Request for Membership of the Council of Europe, Op. No. 195 (1996);Eur. 
Parl. Ass., Russia’s Request for Membership of the Council of Europe, Op. No. 193 (1996); Eur. Parl. Ass., 
Application by Albania for Membership of the Council of Europe, Op. No. 189 (1995); Eur. Parl. Ass., Application
by Moldova for Membership of the Council of Europe, Op. No. 188 (1995); Eur. Parl. Ass., Application by Ukraine 
for Membership of the Council of Europe, Op. No. 190 (1995). 
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For instance, Armenia faced strong criticism from PACE in 2002 for having failed 
to ratify Protocol No. 6 and having failed to abolish the death penalty in its criminal 
code, contrary to commitments made at accession.55 By September 2003, Armenia 
had both ratified Protocol No. 6 and eliminated capital punishment from its 
domestic statutes.56 In other cases, COE pressure did not induce countries to 
abolish. For instance, after a number of executions in Belarus in the late 1990s, 
PACE suspended the country’s status as a Special Guest and froze its accession 
process. PACE urged Belarus “to declare an immediate moratorium on executions 
and set in motion the legislative procedure for the abolition of capital 
punishment.”57
Similarly, following executions in Ukraine in 1996, PACE threatened to 
withhold recognition of the “credentials of the Ukrainian parliamentary delegation 
at its next session.”58 The following year, after more executions, PACE decided to 
“reconsider” the credentials of the Ukrainian delegation, pending notice of a 
moratorium on executions.59 A de facto moratorium followed, but PACE continued 
to condemn Ukraine for failing to honor its accession commitment to ratify 
Protocol No. 6 and abolish capital punishment de jure.60 In 1997, PACE also 
criticized Russia for failing to honor its commitment to institute a moratorium on 
executions, and has since repeatedly pressured Russia to ratify Protocol No. 6. In a 
2005 resolution, PACE reminded Russia that the deadline for ratifying the death 
penalty protocol had passed in 1999, and that other countries had been exposed to 
sanctions for failing to meet the same commitment.61
In general, the COE requirement has been effective in spreading abolition to 
the former communist countries. By 2002, “16 East European countries had 
abolished capital punishment and ratified the Sixth Optional Protocol to the ECHR, 
and three had signed it”—all had been retentionist up to the end of Communist rule 
in 1989.62
The EU has similarly promoted abolition through its enlargement process.63
55 See Eur. Parl. Ass., Armenia’s Application for Membership of the Council of Europe, Op. No. 221 (2000). 
56 See Human Rights Section of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, The Death Penalty in the OSCE Area, Background 
Paper 2003/1 (2003). 
57 Eur. Parl. Ass., Situation in Belarus, Rec. 1441 (2000). 
58 Eur. Parl. Ass., Honouring of the Commitment Entered into by Ukraine upon Accession to the Council of Europe 
to Put into Place a Moratorium on Executions, Res. 1112 (1997). 
59 Eur. Parl. Ass., Executions in Ukraine, Res. 1145 (1998). 
60 See Eur. Parl. Ass., Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Ukraine, Res. 1179 (1999); Eur. Parl. 
Ass, Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Ukraine, Rec. 1416 (1999). 
61 See Eur. Parl. Ass., Russia Must ‘Show Determination’ and Abolish the Death Penalty in Law (2006); Eur. 
Parl. Ass., Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by the Russian Federation, Res. 1455 (2005); Eur. Parl. 
Ass., Honouring of the Commitment Entered into by Russia upon Accession to the Council of Europe to Put into Place 
a Moratorium on Executions, Res. 1111 (1997). 
62HOOD, supra note 30, at 17. 
63 “Enlargement process” refers to the mechanism for and conditions under which states may join the 
European Union. Any European country is able to apply for membership so long as it meets all the of 
the membership criteria. 
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By the early 1990s, as the newly independent states of Central and Eastern Europe 
began to apply for EU membership, all of the existing fifteen EU member states 
had ratified Protocol No. 6 except Belgium, Greece, and the United Kingdom, and 
these three would ratify by 1999. The European Council established in 1993 the 
“Copenhagen Criteria,” political, economic, and legislative conditions that applicant 
states would have to meet before accession. The political criteria included 
“democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of 
minorities.”64 The European Commission translated those general ideals into 
detailed series of specific standards, which it published in “Enlargement Strategy” 
papers. With respect to the death penalty, the Commission’s initial “opinions” 
reported on the status of capital punishment in each applicant country. For instance, 
the response to Bulgaria’s application noted that “the death penalty has not been 
abolished in Bulgaria, but since 1990 it has been subject to a moratorium decreed 
by the President of the Republic.”65 The initial report on Estonia noted that capital 
punishment had not been abolished, but that “[t]he President of the Republic has 
declared a moratorium on the application of the death penalty and the Minister of 
Justice has undertaken to abolish it before February 1, 1998.”66
Succeeding annual reports on each applicant country monitored the status of 
the death penalty and ratification of Protocol No. 6. So, for instance, the 1999 report 
on Poland noted that Protocol No. 6 had not yet been ratified.67 In its overall 
reports, the Commission included tables on the ratification of human rights treaties 
by all of the candidate countries. The June 1999 report showed that of the ten 
applicant states, only Bulgaria, Cyprus, and Poland had not yet ratified ECHR 
Protocol No. 6.68 But by the 2001 report, all had ratified,69 and in 2005, all ten 
candidate states became EU members. The death penalty criterion applied to the 
2007 entrants (Bulgaria and Romania) as well, and will apply in any subsequent 
enlargements.
In short, European institutions have played an active role in pushing new 
democracies in Eastern and Central Europe toward abolition of the death penalty. 
The lure of the Council of Europe and the European Union was so great that post-
Soviet, democratizing countries were willing to give up capital punishment in order 
to gain the political and economic benefits of membership in Europe’s core 
institutions.
64 Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen European Council (June 21–22, 1993). 
65 European Comm’nCommission Opinion on Bulgaria’s Application for Membership of the European Union,
Doc. 97/11 (July 15, 1997).
66 European Comm’n, Agenda 2000: Opinion of the Comm’n on Estonia’s Application for Membership of the 
European Union, DOC 97/12 (July 15, 1997). 
67 See European Comm’n, Regular Report from the Comm’n on Poland’s Progress Towards Accession 11 (1998). 
68 See European Comm’n, Composite Paper: Reps. on Progress Towards Accession by Each of the Candidate 
Countries, annex 3, 49 (1999). 
69 See European Comm’n, Making a Success of Enlargement: Strategy Paper and Rep. of the European Comm’n 
on the Progress Towards Accession by Each of the Candidate Countries (2001). 
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C. Transnational Actors 
Efforts to craft international and regional legal instruments abolishing the 
death penalty began in intergovernmental fora immediately after World War II and 
continue to the present. The effort to ban capital punishment thus predates the 
emergence of transnational human rights NGOs and the expansion of their 
influence. The most prominent international human rights NGOs, Amnesty 
International (AI) and Human Rights Watch (HRW), have become consistent and 
vocal advocates of death penalty abolition. AI, founded in 1961, has made death 
penalty abolition one of its high-priority issue areas. AI’s concern with executions 
arose in connection with its primary initial mission on behalf of political prisoners. 
The organization subsequently came to oppose capital punishment in general, and, 
in 1971, called for its universal abolition. AI launched a global anti-death penalty 
campaign in 1989; since then it has monitored and reported on the status of capital 
punishment around the world and has pushed for abolition.70 HRW was founded 
in 1978 as Helsinki Watch; in 1988, it joined with the other regional “Watch 
Committees” to form the current global organization.71 HRW focuses its attention 
on the death penalty in specific countries rather than on a general campaign for 
abolition. It publicizes and condemns executions, and it reports on the status of 
capital punishment in specific countries in its annual World Report.72
HRW and AI both began to campaign actively for death penalty abolition in 
the 1980s, just before the burst of abolition in national law after 1990. The NGOs 
did not cause that surge, however. The collapse of the Soviet Union, 
democratization in the successor states, and the subsequent inclusion of former 
Soviet states and satellites in the main European institutions—the EU and the 
Council of Europe—were clearly the key proximate causes. We argue that the 
international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) added political and 
normative force to the abolitionist movement. Researchers in the world society 
tradition73 have shown in a variety of substantive contexts that INGOs are effective 
carriers of international norms and institutional forms into national contexts.74 With 
70 See Amnesty Int’l, Death Sentences and Executions: 2017, AI Index ACT 50/7955/2018 (2018). 
71 History, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH ( Feb. 4, 2019), https://www.hrw.org/history. 
72 The most recent World Report is available at https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019 (Feb. 4, 2019). 
73 World Society theory focuses on transnational interaction and global social change and explores the 
importance of international institutions and culture in shaping the behavior of individuals, 
organizations, and states. Researchers of the world society tradition do not necessarily see individual 
states or the international system as predominant and the unit of analysis, but rather the global 
population, which is based upon and organized around common values and goals. As a result, INGOs 
play a key role as carriers of ideas, morals, and values.
74 See, e.g. Wade M. Cole, Hard and Soft Commitments to Human Rights Treaties,1966–2000, 24 SOC. F. 563 
(2009); Christine Min Wotipka & Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Global Human Rights and State Sovereignty: State 
Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties, 1965–2001, 23 SOC. F. 724 (2008); Kiyoteru Tsutsui & 
Christine Min Wotipka, Global Civil Society and the International Human Rights Movement: Citizen Participation 
in Human Rights International Nongovernmental Organizations, 83 SOC. FORCES 587 (2004); John W. Meyer 
et al., World Society and the Nation-State, 103 AM. J. OF SOC. 144 (1997); John Boli, Human Rights or State 
Expansion? Cross-National Definitions of Constitutional Rights, 1870-1970, in INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
(George Thomas, et al. eds., 1987); John Boli-Bennett & John Meyer, The Ideology of Childhood and the 
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respect to death penalty abolition, Kim argues: 
[H]uman rights INGOs can empower pro-abolition constituencies and 
influence governments’ calculations and deliberations toward abolition. 
Specifically, they do so by framing capital punishment as a human rights 
violation through abolitionist campaigns and lobbying parliamentarians to 
repeal death penalty laws. Through their anti-death penalty activism, 
human rights INGOs tip the domestic political balance between pro- and 
anti-death penalty constituencies in favor of complete abolition.75
Kim’s empirical analysis demonstrates a strong link between the presence of 
human rights INGOs in a country and the likelihood that the country abolishes the 
death penalty for all crimes.76
We offer a similar argument and find support for it using a new method for 
gauging INGO influence. As a first cut, we present a descriptive picture of the scale 
of INGO death penalty activism. Instead of measuring the number of human rights 
INGOs present in a country, we assessed the documents (world reports, country 
reports) produced by AI and HRW. We classified the documents as to whether they 
address a specific country or are global in coverage. Using textual analysis tools, we 
counted the number of occurrences in each document of three key phrases: “death 
penalty,” “death sentence,” and “capital punishment,” coding each such reference 
as a “hit.”77 The number of documents addressing a specific country in any given 
year is small, usually one or two. For specific countries, we therefore use the number 
of “hits” (death penalty references) in country-specific documents in a given year as 
a measure of INGO activity regarding the death penalty within that country. We 
likewise counted the number of general INGO documents (not country-specific) 
that include the death penalty phrases. The number of years covered for the two 
organizations differs because AI was created fifteen years before HRW. Figure 5 
depicts the total number of documents, both general and country-specific, referring 
to the death penalty. It shows that the highest occurrences of death penalty phrases 
are reached during the 1990s and after 2000. The following figure (Figure 6) shows 
the number of hits in all INGO documents; these also peak at nearly one thousand 
hits per year after the year 2000. Clearly, death penalty abolition was the subject of 
vigorous INGO campaigning during the key period (during the 1990s and after 
2000).
State: Rules Distinguishing Children in National Constitutions, 1870–1970, 43 AM. SOC. REV. 797 (1978).
75 Dongwook Kim, International Non-governmental Organizations and the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 22 
EUR. J. OF INT’L REL. 596 (2016). 
76 See id.
77 The term “execution” and its stem (“execut”) could not be used because they collected too many 
unrelated terms related to, for example, the executive branch, an executive summary, and so on. 
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III. DATA AND ANALYSIS
The analysis now focuses on abolition of the death penalty in national law. 
Because penal law and the carrying out of punishments is a matter of domestic law 
and practice, the settling of a death penalty TLO must be visible at the national 
level. We therefore model the most comprehensive form of abolition (for all crimes) 
in domestic law. We utilize a technique—Cox proportional hazard models—that 
allows us to estimate the extent to which various domestic and international factors 
affect (a) the likelihood that a country will abolish the death penalty and, if it does, 
(b) how long it takes to do so. The period covered by our analyses begins in 1960 
and ends in 2012;78 the models include at least 150 countries.79
Our central puzzle is that death penalty abolition virtually always occurs 
despite majority public support for retention. As Hood and Hoyle put it, “[W]here 
abolition has come about it has not been as a result of the majority of the general 
public supporting it.”80 Indeed, abolition has generally occurred despite public 
opposition. As Gottschalk et al. put it, “Leading European countries abolished the 
death penalty [after World War II] in the face of strong, sometimes overwhelming, 
public support for its retention.”81 This was the case in Germany (abolished 1949), 
the United Kingdom (abolished 1969), France (1981), as well as Canada (1998).82
As we report in our brief case study of Lithuania, abolition there followed the same 
pattern.83 The absence of comprehensive cross-national public opinion data makes 
it impossible to demonstrate conclusively that no state has ever abolished the death 
penalty at a time when the public supported such a change. However, in our review 
of country studies, we have yet to find an instance of supportive public opinion at 
the time of abolition. 
The TLO framework posits constant recursivity, that is, influences flowing in 
both directions across levels (national and international) and between law and 
practices.84 Thus, changes in law can affect attitudes and beliefs. There is evidence 
of that effect in death penalty abolition. To be sure, in some countries that have 
already abolished, public majorities favor reintroduction of capital punishment; 
examples include Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Peru, South Africa, the Czech 
Republic, and Poland.85 But public support for the death penalty sometimes declines 
78 The analysis loses little by not starting before 1960 as only two countries (Honduras and the Federal 
Republic of Germany) abolished the death penalty for all crimes between 1945 and 1959. Data for some 
key variables are not available for years prior to 1960. 
79 The main models (1–4) include between 154 to 160 countries. Models 5–8, in which we include 
variables such as ethnic war, ethnic violence, civil war, and extrajudicial killings, cover 136 to 144 
countries due to the lack of data for these variables. 
80 See HOOD & HOYLE, supra note 2, at 350. 
81 MARIE GOTTSCHALK, et al., THE PRISON AND THE GALLOWS: THE POLITICS OF MASS
INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 227 (2006). 
82 See HOOD & HOYLE, supra note 2, at 352. 
83 See infra Part IV pp, 253–54. 
84 See Halliday & Shaffer, supra note 4. 
85 See HOOD & HOYLE, supra note 2, at 374–76. 
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after its abolition. Over time, people come to see capital punishment as outmoded.86
In some countries, including in Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Australia, 
and New Zealand, where public opinion supported retention of capital punishment 
pre-abolition, that support declined steadily—and dramatically—post-abolition.87
In many, perhaps most, countries (including some that have already 
abolished), capital punishment is regarded as not just appropriate for certain crimes 
but as necessary for upholding social morality and values. We therefore theorize 
that there are certain institutional arrangements under which it is possible for a 
polity to overcome majoritarian opposition to abolition. We suggest two such 
mechanisms, one legislative and one judicial. 
1. Proportional Representation (PR). Some democratic electoral systems will be 
more favorable to abolition than others. In parliamentary systems with at least some 
PR (seats allocated to parties according to their overall share of the vote), political 
parties are less constrained by the median voter (who tends to be retentionist) 
because they can negotiate policy tradeoffs in the legislature with less fear of broader 
electoral punishment. PR tends to produce multiparty governments, in which some 
parties might represent voters who favor abolition and other parties might see 
abolition as a low-priority issue for their supporters or who would be willing to trade 
support for abolition for concessions on other issues. In other words, PR offers 
more space for log-rolling and issue tradeoffs.88 We therefore include a variable that 
captures whether states have at least some level of proportional representation in 
the legislature. 
Given our argument that publics are generally retentionist, we must anticipate 
that democratic institutions play an ambiguous role. The more faithfully 
democratically elected legislatures follow the majority preferences of the public, the 
less likely they are to enact laws abolishing the death penalty. We therefore also 
include a variable measuring the quality of democracy in states, but we expect it to 
be either insignificant or to demonstrate a negative association with the likelihood 
of abolition. 
2. Judicial Independence. Courts are non-majoritarian institutions. Though courts 
are necessarily strategic and pay attention to the other branches of government and 
broader social developments, they are less constrained by mass public opinion or 
the median voter. Apex courts can find that the death penalty is incompatible with 
a country’s constitution or with its international obligations (for instance, the 
ECHR). Indeed, the judicial mechanism can operate in tandem with the legislative 
one. For example, a parliament that is eager to join the COE might refer the 
question of the constitutionality of the death penalty to a constitutional court, 
hoping for a ruling of unconstitutionality. As we will show, abolition in Lithuania 
86 See id., at 376. 
87 See id., at 376–77. 
88 See Anthony McGann & Wayne Sandholtz, Patterns of Death Penalty Abolition, 1960–2005: Domestic and 
International Factors, 56 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY 275 (2012); ANDREW HAMMEL,
ENDING THE DEATH PENALTY: THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (2010). 
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followed this path. We therefore include in the models a variable that measures the 
degree of judicial independence in states, on the hypothesis that courts that are more 
independent from the political branches will be more capable of ruling the death 
penalty impermissible. 
In addition to PR and Judicial Independence, we also argue that transnational 
influences can affect public and elite opinion regarding the death penalty. The two 
major sources of transnational influence are INGOs and regional organizations, 
both of which operate through persuasion, socialization and material incentives. 
3. INGO Influence. We include two measures of the effects of INGO pressure 
and persuasion on national abolition. One is a count of the number of occurrences 
of death penalty phrases in INGO documents regarding a specific country in a given 
year. This is a measure of the attention INGOs have devoted to the death penalty 
for that state. The second measure counts the global number of death penalty 
references in INGO documents, both country-specific texts and general texts, in a 
given year. Of course, INGOs engage in a variety of other activities, including direct 
lobbying of elected officials, filing amicus briefs in a country’s courts, supporting 
local abolitionist organizations and campaigns, and providing technical assistance 
to governments and civil society actors contemplating constitutional revision, 
legislation, or litigation. Our INGO document variables are meant to capture, in 
broad terms, the overall level of INGO attention to death penalty issues, thus 
serving as indicators of their persuasive and socialization effects. The higher the 
value on either INGO measure, the more likely a state is to abolish. 
4. Regional Organization Incentives. The regional ordering of the death penalty in 
the key European institutions (described above) has been decisive for many states 
that gained independence after 1990. A variable that directly measures this 
phenomenon is difficult to implement because, in the case of the COE, membership 
in the organization is virtually coterminous with death penalty abolition. A series of 
regional dummies roughly capture this effect. 
Finally, we include variables to capture the influence of additional factors that 
could affect a country’s likelihood of abolishing. 
•Post-election year. Because abolition generally requires counter-majoritarian 
policy-making, governments may be more likely to abolish when their 
political support is presumably highest, namely, right after an election. 
The first year after an election is also generally farther in time from the 
next election, meaning that governments have time to rebuild any support 
they might lose as a result of abolitionist legislation. We include a variable 
that indicates the year after a national election in democratic countries 
(since elections in autocratic states have little meaning). 
•Prior steps toward abolition. Many countries approach abolition in steps. In 
order to capture a country’s previous movement toward complete 
abolition, we include a variable that indicates whether that state had 
previously abolished the death penalty for ordinary crimes. Prior progress 
toward abolition should make complete abolition more likely. 
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•Country size. Larger countries (measured either in terms of population or total 
GDP) may be less likely to abolish, given that the challenges of social 
control could be larger. 
•Religion. Prior research has shown that dominant religions can influence a 
country’s likelihood of abolishing.89 We include variables for the 
percentage of the population adhering to Protestant Christianity, 
Catholicism, and Islam. In light of the Catholic church’s official 
condemnation of the death penalty, strongly Catholic countries may be 
more likely to abolish. 
•Ethnic fragmentation and conflict. Governments may be more inclined to retain 
the death penalty in countries with politically volatile ethnic divisions. The 
death penalty is often a tool of repression, which can be used to intimidate 
or eliminate leaders of rival ethnic groups. We include variables capturing 
the degree of ethnic fractionalization, the level of ethnic violence, and the 
presence of interethnic armed conflict. 
•Repression. Governments that engage in political repression may be more 
inclined to retain the death penalty as a potent tool. We include a measure 
of states’ use of extrajudicial killing, which could be operated in two ways. 
Extrajudicial killing could be a complement of capital punishment 
(governments that make use of one also employ the other) or a substitute 
(repressive governments might use extrajudicial killings so as not to be 
seen executing opponents). 
•Civil War. We also include an indicator of the existence of civil war, which 
could also motivate governments to keep the death penalty as an 
instrument for suppressing rebels or rival political formations. 
Some additional variables that might seem logical candidates for inclusion 
cannot be included. One would be data on homicide rates, on the supposition that 
high levels of violent crime might increase elite commitment to the death penalty as 
a tool for punishing and deterring crime. Unfortunately, reliable cross-national data 
on homicide rates do not exist for even a single-year cross section, much less for an 
analysis covering fifty-three years. Every existing source of national homicide data 
depends on national reporting, which varies so wildly in quality, reliability, and 
coverage that no cross-national analysis is possible. The best single source of 
homicide data is the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), which 
has compiled data on national homicide counts and rates since 2003. But even the 
UNODC warns, “Data supplied by countries may not exactly reflect the definition 
[of intentional homicide] provided by UNODC,” and “When using the figures, any 
cross-national comparison should be conducted with caution because of the 
differences that exist between the legal definitions of offences in countries, the 
different methods of offence counting and recording and differences in the share 
of criminal offences that are not reported to or detected by law enforcement 
89 See McGann & Sandholtz, supra note 87. 
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authorities.”90 There is, nevertheless, some research on the relationship between 
homicide rates and death penalty abolition. One study involving fifty-one countries 
found no bivariate correlation between homicide rates and either support for the 
death penalty in public opinion or retention of capital punishment.91 A second study 
assessed 140 countries and found no significant relationship between homicide rates 
and the likelihood of a country abolishing the death penalty.92 A third study, utilizing 
multiple sources of homicide data, found the same thing: no relationship.93 Each of 
these three studies was cross-sectional (analyzing a single year and the current 
abolition status of countries), making it impossible to model the abolition choice as 
we do. Given the data inadequacies and the evidence that homicide rates do not 
correlate with abolition, we have no reservations in omitting such a variable from 
the models. 
A second potentially plausible but unusable variable is imprisonment rates. 
Again, reliable cross-national data with sufficient time coverage are simply not 
available. In one study, imprisonment rates are shown to be positively associated 
with death penalty retention—but in only half of the models.94 The problem is that 
using data for a single year, and analyzing whether countries have abolished or not 
(as opposed to analyzing the decision to abolish), it is difficult to reach any 
conclusion about the relationship between imprisonment rates and death penalty 
abolition. On the one hand, high imprisonment rates might be associated with 
countries that have abolished if the lack of executions means more people in prison. 
On the other hand, low imprisonment rates might be associated with countries that 
have abolished if they are an indicator of a less punitive criminal justice system. Due 
to the lack of data reliability and coverage, we do not include a measurement for 
imprisonment rates. 
Figure 7 presents the results of the main regression (Model 1 in the Appendix, 
reestimated with standardized variables). It depicts the estimated effect, with 95 
percent confidence intervals, of each variable on the likelihood that a country will 
abolish the death penalty for all crimes. Estimates to the left of the zero-line 
decrease the likelihood of abolition; markers to the right of zero mean that the 
variable increases the likelihood of abolition. If the confidence interval lines overlap 
zero, we cannot be confident that the effect of the variable is not due to chance (it 
is not significant at the conventional five percent level). In addition, because the 
graph represents standardized coefficients (for the nonbinary variables), we can 
compare the relative size of the effects of the variables. 
90 UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, HOMICIDE COUNTS AND RATES (2000–2015)
(2018) (on file with author). 
91 See Peter J. van Koppen et al., Public Reasons for Abolition and Retention of the Death Penalty, 12 INT’L
CRIM. J. REV. 77, 86 (2002). 
92 See Rick Ruddell & Martin G. Urbina, Minority Threat and Punishment: A Cross-National Analysis, 21 
JUST. Q. 904, 923 (2004). 
93 See David F. Greenberg & Valerie West, Siting the Death Penalty Internationally, 33 L. & SOC. INQUIRY
295, 320 (2008). 
94 See id., at 318. 
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Figure 7
We were particularly interested in (1) institutional arrangements that could 
make non-majoritarian policy-making more likely, and (2) transnational influences. 
A few findings stand out. First, the analysis shows that proportional representation 
has the expected effect of making abolition more likely; this is consistent with our 
argument that PR institutions make log-rolling and policy tradeoffs more feasible, 
even in contexts in which a majority of the public might favor retention of the death 
penalty. We also argued that independent courts would be more likely to rule the 
death penalty incompatible with constitutional law or treaty obligations. The 
analysis also shows that judicial independence is associated with an increased 
likelihood of abolition, but that it is significant in only some of the models.95
Country-specific INGO attention clearly has the hypothesized effect. Each increase 
of one in the number of country-specific INGO hits increases the likelihood of 
abolition by about twenty to twenty-five percent.96 Prior abolition for ordinary 
crimes, not surprisingly, makes abolition for all crimes more likely. Finally, the 
analysis illustrates that there is a strong, positive effect of Western Europe and 
Eastern and Central European regions on the likelihood of abolition. We interpret 
the effects of Western Europe and Eastern and Central European regions as rough 
indicators of the influence of the main European organizations, the COE and the 
95 See Table A in the Appendix. 
96 See the full results reported in the Appendix.
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EU.97 Countries in Oceania and sub-Saharan Africa are also more likely to abolish.98
The variables representing the decades covered by this analysis control for the 
possibility that the likelihood of abolishing varies from decade to decade, as a 
product, for example, of broad international trends that affect many or most 
countries. Confirming what we presented in Figures 1 and 2 above, the 1990s—
following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union—were a 
period in which numerous countries ended capital punishment. 
Some of the other findings are worth noting briefly (see the Appendix for 
more complete results): 
•Democracies are more likely to abolish the death penalty in the year after an 
election, though the effect is not significant at the .10 level. 
•In terms of religion, we expected that the larger the share of the population 
that is Catholic, the higher the likelihood of abolishing; neither of the 
other two religion variables (percent Protestant and percent Muslim) had 
a significant effect.99
•Various measures of ethnic heterogeneity and conflict (ethnic fractionalization, 
ethnic violence, and ethnic war) had no significant effect on abolition. 
•We suggested that extrajudicial killing could be a complement of capital 
punishment (repressive governments might use both) or a substitute 
(repressive governments might use extrajudicial killings so as not to be 
seen executing opponents). Neither intuition was supported by the 
analysis because the coefficient failed to reach significance. 
•Civil war likewise had no significant effect on abolition. Our interpretation 
is that countries involved in civil wars do not appear to retain the death 
penalty as a tool for eliminating rebels. 
IV. CASE STUDIES
In the following brief case studies, we seek to illustrate the main arguments. 
We selected two countries that fit the account of TLO development supported by 
the data analysis (Lithuania and South Africa) and two countries that could be seen 
as “off the regression line” and that did not abolish (Belarus and Japan). 
Furthermore, we chose countries in different geographic regions in an effort to 
diversify our case selection and trace the process of death penalty abolition in 
different regional contexts. Finally, our case selection was also influenced by data 
availability and the ability to draw from a variety of sources to cross-validate the 
information. Our investigation into the cases aligns with the findings of our 
97 The omitted region is the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), which has the lowest regional 
rate of abolition. The hazard ratios for the regional variables reported in the appendix should be 
interpreted as multiplying the likelihood of abolition as compared to MENA. Thus, in Model 1, countries 
in Western Europe are nearly six times as likely as MENA countries to abolish the death penalty in any 
given period. 
98 See generally HOOD & HOYLE, supra note 2 chs. 2 & 3 (discussing abolition trends in those regions). 
99 See Appendix. 
[2019] LEGAL ORDERING OF THE DEATH PENALTY 151 
quantitative analysis: democratic institutions, domestic and international NGO 
activism, as well as regional institutions and incentives play key roles in the path to 
abolition.
A. Lithuania 
Lithuania displays several of the factors that we have argued make it possible 
to abolish capital punishment despite majority public opinion in favor of retention. 
Particularly crucial were democratization and the strong motivation to join the EU 
and the COE. Lithuania also illustrates that courts offer a mechanism for 
overcoming popular support for retention. 
Lithuania made use of capital punishment during the Soviet era (1940–90) but 
began to shift away from it after regaining independence in 1990. The new 
constitution established a semi-presidential multi-party system, with the President 
as the head of state and the Prime Minister as the head of government. Lithuania’s 
democratic transition included judicial and penal reforms, and it was in that context 
that the death penalty became a central issue.100 In the early 1990s, Lithuania revised 
its Criminal Code to gradually limit the use of the death penalty. 
Joining European institutions—the COE and eventually the EU—was also a 
central element of Lithuania’s transition.101 Lithuania joined the COE and was 
thereby exposed to European debates on the abolition of the death penalty. More 
specifically, PACE criticized Lithuania and other Eastern European countries for 
the use of the death penalty and subsequently urged them to end executions.102 In 
response to the PACE’s recommendation, President Algirdas Brazauskas 
announced a moratorium on capital punishment in July 1996 and sent a draft law 
to the Lithuanian Parliament to suspend executions until the passage of a new 
Criminal Code. Parliament never debated the proposal, finding it too 
controversial.103 However, in 1997, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia revived efforts to 
abolish the death penalty when they accepted a “Resolution on the Abolition of the 
Death Penalty” during a session of the Baltic Assembly that urged states to sign 
Protocol No. 6 to the ECHR.104 In response, the Lithuanian parliament prepared a 
draft law abolishing the death penalty. However, again due to political and public 
pressures, the law was not debated until 1998. Political leaders found abolition 
unattractive in light of public support for retention. In fact, public opinion in the 
1990s was “firmly in favour of the death penalty,” at the level of seventy to eighty 
percent.105
100 See Aleksandros Dobryninas, The Experience of Lithuania’s Journey to Abolition, in CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT: STRATEGIES FOR ABOLITION 236 (Peter Hodgkinson & William A. Schabas eds., 2004); 
Peter Hodgkinson, Europe–A Death Penalty Free Zone: Commentary and Critique of Abolitionist Strategies, 26 
OHIO N. U. L. REV. 625, 637 (2000). 
101 See HOOD & HOYLE, supra note 2, at 64–65. 
102 See Dobryninas, supra note 99, at 235–36. 
103 See Dobryninas, supra note 99, at 236; see Hodgkinson, supra note 99, at 637. 
104 See Dobryninas, supra note 99, at 235–36. 
105 See id., at 236–37. 
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In an effort to increase public awareness in Lithuania about capital punishment 
and promote a pro-abolitionist viewpoint across society, human rights organizations 
introduced various projects in 1996–99 to “show that the death penalty was 
inhumane, inefficient and unjust and had no place in a contemporary criminal justice 
system.”106 The COE helped to fund a public education project in Lithuania aimed 
at shifting opinion toward abolition. Faced with the dilemma of overwhelming 
constituent support for retention, but strongly desiring to join the EU, Lithuanian 
legislators passed the matter to the Constitutional Court, in essence asking the Court 
to take the abolitionist step for them.107 The Constitutional Court investigated the 
compatibility of the death penalty with the Lithuanian Constitution and found it 
unconstitutional in December 1998.108 Within weeks, the Lithuanian Parliament had 
modified the criminal Code, and the following month, it ratified Protocol No. 6, 
officially abolishing the death penalty for all crimes. 
B. South Africa 
South Africa also displays several of the factors that make abolition more 
likely, including a democratic transition, international influences, and NGO 
activism. The apartheid regime of South Africa relied heavily on death sentences 
because this form of punishment was considered a means of controlling violent 
crime and protecting the white minority from the majority African population.109
The apartheid government also cited public opinion as a source for retention.110
However, the political apartheid system started to crumble in the late 1980s, giving 
way to constitutional change and social reforms, which would eventually amend and 
halt cruel types of treatment of prisoners and punishment such as the death penalty. 
Even before the abandonment of apartheid, domestic and international 
pressure from states and non-state organizations fueled reforms and revitalized the 
cause for abolition. For instance, the South African Youth Congress, a new anti-
apartheid organization, began to fight executions of anti-apartheid activists.111 The 
Opposition Spokesman for Justice in Parliament also requested an investigation into 
death penalty practice in 1988 and 1989. Furthermore, various organizations—the 
Institute for Race Relations, the Association of Law Societies, the Society of 
University Teachers of Law, the General Council of the Bar, the Medical 
Association of South Africa, and especially Black Sash as well as Lawyers for Human 
Rights—pressed the government to reopen the discussion on the death penalty.112
International pressure supported domestic calls for abolition. In 1986, AI 
106 See id.
107 See Hodgkinson, supra note 99, at 637–38. 
108 See HOOD & HOYLE, supra note 2, at 64–65. 
109 See Peter Norbert Bouckaert, Shutting Down the Death Factory: The Abolition of Capital Punishment in 
South Africa, 32 STAN. J. OF INT’L L. 292–93 (1996). 
110 See PETER HODGKINSON & ANDREW RUTHERFORD, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: GLOBAL ISSUES
AND PROSPECTS 161 (1996). 
111 See Bouckaert, supra note 108, at 296. 
112 See id.
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announced a campaign to end human rights abuses in South Africa, calling attention 
to the death penalty. AI also sent an open letter to President Botha condemning the 
death penalty for political prisoners. U.N. General Assembly resolutions in 1986, 
1987, and 1988 denounced apartheid and also opposed the death penalty and called 
for a halt to executions.113
In February 1990, President F.W. De Klerk gave in to the increasing domestic 
and international pressures and set the path to democratic reform.114 Such proposed 
reforms included the unbanning of political parties, the release of Nelson Mandela, 
as well as the revision of the death penalty legislation.115 The President also 
announced a death penalty moratorium, stating that “no executions will take place 
until Parliament has taken a final decision on the new proposals.”116 One year later, 
President De Klerk’s proposals were adopted, greatly reducing the applicability of 
the death penalty.117
Following democratic elections in 1994, an interim Constitution with a Bill of 
Rights was introduced, which enhanced the power of the Constitutional Court.118
The new Minister of Justice saw the death penalty as contrary to the human rights 
regime and a resumption of executions as undermining fundamental rights given by 
the new 1994 constitution.119 In June 1995, the Constitutional Court decided 
unanimously that the death penalty was unconstitutional.120 The judgment drew 
attention to the international and regional abolition trend by stating that capital 
punishment had been abolished “by almost half the countries of the world including 
democracies of Europe and our neighboring countries Namibia, Mozambique and 
Angola,” and by referring to AI reports to stress that capital punishment was 
“seldom used” in retentionist countries.121 The court’s decision was endorsed by 
the South African Parliament, and with the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1997, 
all references to capital punishment were removed from South Africa’s statute 
book.122
113Amnesty International Press Release and Open Letter to President Botha, African Activist Archive, 
Michigan State University (1986), http://kora.matrix.msu.edu/files/50/304/32-130-229B-84-
AI%20Hawaii%203-12-86%20opt.pdf. ( last visited on on Oct.6, 2018); G.A. Res. A 41/35, Policies of 
apartheid of the Government of South Africa, (Nov. 10, 1986); G.A. Res. A 42/23, Policies of apartheid 
of the Government of South Africa, (Nov. 20, 1987); G.A. Res. A 43/50, Policies of apartheid of the 
Government of South Africa, (Dec. 5, 1988). 
114 F.W. De Klerk, State President of South Africa, Speech to Parliament (Feb. 2, 1990), as reprinted in 
Bouckaert, supra note 108, at 297; See also HODGKINSON & RUTHERFORD, supra note 109, at 161.
115 See Bouckaert, supra note 108, at 297. 
116 See id., at 296–97; Hodgkinson & Rutherford, at 161. 
117 See Bouckaert, supra note 108, at 297. 
118 See id., at 300–01. 
119 See id., at 301. 
120 See id., at 304; Hodgkinson & Rutherford, at 161. 
121 S. v. Makwanyane 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) at 685 (S. Afr.), as reprinted in Bouckaert, supra note 88, 
at 306. 
122 See HOOD & HOYLE, supra note 2, at 89. 
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C. Belarus 
Belarus is the only country in Europe that actively applies the death penalty, 
though Criminal Code revisions in 1999 limited the scope and applicability of capital 
punishment and thereby reduced the number of executions. While there were forty-
seven executions in 1998, this number decreased to an average of two per year since 
2008.123 The Belarussian government has claimed that the reason to retain the death 
penalty is public support for it, pointing to a 1996 referendum where eighty-five 
percent of the votes were in favor of retaining capital punishment. Unlike in 
Lithuania and South Africa, where abolition passed despite public support, Belarus 
still retains the death penalty on these grounds. However, Belarus also lacked several 
of the factors that are associated with abolition: democratic government, robust 
INGO activity, the incentive of membership in the EU and the COE, and 
independent courts. 
Belarus has been ruled autocratically since independence. It has lacked a 
developed parliament, separation of powers, a real opposition that is able to 
challenge the ruling parties loyal to President Lukashenko, and fair and secret 
elections. The Venice Commission of the COE stated that Belarus’s constitution 
was “illegal” and “[did] not respect minimum democratic standards and violates the 
separation of powers and the rule of law.”124 Another major concern for European 
institutions and INGOs is the lack of judicial independence and its effect on the 
criminal justice system. AI and HRW have criticized the country’s judicial system, 
pointing to unfair trials, no presumption of innocence, torture and ill-treatment of 
prisoners, lack of confidential communications with lawyers, and lack of 
independent investigations.125
We have also argued that INGOs can be carriers of anti-death penalty norms. 
Though AI has criticized Belarus, NGOs are often unable to operate there 
effectively and without government interference. For instance, Viasna, a leading 
local human rights organization, was not allowed to register in 2003 even though 
such a denial is a violation of the ICCPR.126 Unregistered organizations are not 
allowed to receive or spend funding, and any activities carried out are punishable 
with imprisonment. In 2011, Belarus refused to let AI, Viasna, and the Belarus 
Helsinki Committee deliver to the president a petition in favor of abolition.127 While 
INGOs such as AI and HRW have been reporting human rights abuses and have 
campaigned against Belarus’ death penalty practices, they have also decried the lack 
of public information on executions as hindering abolitionist efforts. 
123 See VIKTORIA SERGEYEVA & ALLA POKRAS, THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY AND ITS 
ALTERNATIVE SANCTION IN EASTERN EUROPE: BELARUS, RUSSIA AND UKRAINE 8 (2012). 
124 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, REPORT 99 (1998).
125 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ENDING EXECUTIONS IN EUROPE: TOWARDS ABOLITION OF THE 
DEATH PENALTY IN BELARUS (2009), https://www.refworld.org/docid/49cb3e112.html; HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, “Belarus: Abolish the Death Penalty” (2012), https://www.hrw.org/news/ 
2012/03/19/belarus-abolish-death-penalty (last visited Oct. 24, 2018). 
126 See SERGEYEVA & POKRAS, supra note 122, at 22. 
127 See id., at 23. 
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The absence of democratic, rule of law institutions bears directly on another 
pro-abolition factor: European regional organizations. The COE and the EU made 
democratization and respect for rights prerequisites for membership, creating 
powerful incentives for newly independent states in Central and Eastern Europe to 
(among other steps) abolish capital punishment. The Belorussian regime under 
President Lukashenko has embraced a conservative Stalinist ideology and has 
oriented itself away from Europe. A report issued by the European Parliament 
described EU-Belarus relations as “hav[ing] always been difficult and hav[ing] 
developed at a much slower pace” compared to other countries.128 Relations with 
the EU remained strained throughout the 1990s and 2000s; in fact, the EU has 
reduced “contacts between the EU and Belarus to below ministerial level and 
terminated all technical assistance.”129 This outcome was mainly a result of Belarus’ 
continued reluctance to meet human rights standards by the continuation of the 
death penalty. The EU underlined that “specific and irreversible steps of Belarus on 
promotion of universal freedoms involving freedom of speech . . . as well as the 
rule of law and human rights, [and] abolition of the death penalty would be the key point 
to . . . further relations with the country.”130 The PACE agreed in 2009 to restore 
Belarus’s guest status if the country introduced an official moratorium on 
executions. This revived the debate and Belorussian officials expressed interest in 
moving towards a moratorium due to both prospects of regaining COE guest status 
as well as changes in public opinion increasingly supporting abolition. Belarus 
acknowledged to the UN Human Rights Council the importance of shifting public 
opinion on the death penalty and of eventually abolishing it. However, after the 
disputed presidential elections of December 2010, President Lukashenko halted 
progress toward abolition. The main argument for this development was the 
terrorist attack on the Minsk subway in 2011; the two men responsible for the attack 
were sentenced to death by the Supreme Court in 2011 and executed in 2012. The 
latest human rights dialogue between Belarus and the EU occurred in July 2017 and 
specifically addressed freedoms of expression, assembly, and association, as well as 
electoral rights, and the death penalty.131
D. Japan 
Besides the United States, Japan is now the only highly developed democratic 
country that retains the death penalty in legal and practical terms.132 However, 
compared to the US and other Asian countries, where executions have been 
128 GISELLE BOSSE & ALENA VIEIRA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN BELARUS: THE EU’S ROLE SINCE 2016, at
8 (2018). 
129 Id., at 18. 
130 Id., at 21, (emphasis added). 
131 Id., at 22. 
132 See David T. Johnson, Progress and Problems in Japanese Capital Punishment, in CONFRONTING CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT IN ASIA: HUMAN RIGHTS, POLITICS, AND PUBLIC OPINION 168, 168 (Roger Hood & 
Surya Deva eds., 2013); MAI SATO, THE DEATH PENALTY IN JAPAN: WILL THE PUBLIC TOLERATE
ABOLITION? 21 (2014). 
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decreasing in recent years, Japan presents a unique case with its increasing numbers 
in death penalty sentences and executions.133 Historically, except for a brief period 
in the late 1980s, during which the country implemented a moratorium on capital 
punishment for three years, Japan has been consistently retentionist since the end 
of World War II.134 The Japanese government grounds the decision for maintaining 
the death penalty in public support for retention. A government survey in 2009 
found that eighty-six percent of participants favored retention.135 Interestingly, 
death penalty practice in Japan takes place out of public view, leaving the public 
with only “abstract ideas” about the legal and practical procedures of execution.136
Why has Japan not followed the path of most other wealthy democracies, abolishing 
the death penalty despite retentionist public opinion? We argued that proportional 
representation increases the likelihood of legislative bargains that include abolition. 
Japan’s political system has prevented those kinds of coalitional log-rolling 
agreements.
Though Japan has a multiparty system, the conservative Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDC) has been the dominant ruling party since it was founded in 1955. Other 
parties were largely irrelevant until the Democratic Party (DPJ) emerged in 1998. 
After defeating the LDC in the 2009 general elections, the DPJ held power for three 
years. While abolitionists expected this to be a potential breakthrough moment for 
death penalty abolition, executions continued to be carried out during this time, 
albeit at a decreased rate.137 With the LDC regaining power in 2013, executions have 
again been increasing.138 Japan’s judiciary has also referenced the majority public 
support for retention to justify continued application of death penalty sentences and 
executions.139 Several Ministers of Justice referred directly or indirectly to the “duty 
to order executions.”140 The Supreme Court has acknowledged the global trend of 
abolition but has also referred to government surveys on public attitudes favoring 
retention for its reluctance to challenge the constitutionality of the death penalty.141
As Sato notes, the court considers that abolishing the death penalty is a “‘legislative 
policy decision’ rather than a judicial action.”142
In terms of domestic and international pressure, thus far Japan has successfully 
resisted demands for abolition. Like in Belarus, NGOs do not have the ability to 
operate at full effect and face a variety of regulations and restrictions in Japan. Local 
NGOs often receive funding from the government and have been referred to as 
133 See HOOD & HOYLE, supra note 2, at 112 ; Johnson, supra note 131, at 168. 
134 See SATO , supra note 131, at 22. 
135 See HOOD & HOYLE, supra note 2, at 113; SATO, supra note 131, at 25 
136 Shigemitsu, Dando, Toward the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 72 Ind. L.J. 9, 10 (1996), quoted in SATO,
supra note 131, at 25. 
137 See Johnson, supra note 131, at 170; SATO, supra note 131, at 22. 
138 See SATO , supra note 131, at 22. 
139 See Shanhe Jiang, et al., Death Penalty Views in China, Japan and the U.S.: An Empirical Comparison, 38 
JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 863 (2010); SATO, supra note 131, at 23. 
140 Johnson, supra note 131, at 171. 
141 See SATO, supra note 131, at 24. 
142 Id., quoting Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l’Homme [FIDH], 2003, p.10). 
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“quasi-governmental organizations.”143 Further, human rights NGOs lack 
consultation status and do not participate in the drafting of official human rights 
reports in Japan. NGOs have access to these reports only after they are published 
and they have to submit separate reports to international organizations.144 In terms 
of INGO activity, AI has consistently criticized Japan’s retentionist position as well 
as the questionable procedures surrounding the practice. The EU in 2001 threatened 
to withdraw Japan’s observer status. Though Japan did not respond, the EU has yet 
to follow through with this threat.145
CONCLUSION
In this conclusion, we return to questions posed in the introductory essay. 
Framing. The death penalty TLO is not about enhancing the power of state 
officials to combat transnational crime. The death penalty is situated at the 
punishment end of the criminal justice spectrum, and thus the death penalty TLO 
is about establishing limits to what the state can do to punish the guilty. Capital 
punishment is framed by advocates and policy entrepreneurs as a global human 
rights problem. In this sense, domestic processes of enforcement have “become 
more enmeshed in transnational frameworks.”146 The post-World War II context 
was propitious for advancing a human rights framing of the death penalty, in 
reaction to the massive abuses of execution as a tool of political repression and 
genocide. But the success of the human rights framing has been partial because 
normative counter-narratives are available, even within the expanding international 
human rights regime. The right to life is not absolute; taking human life is 
permissible in war and in personal self-defense, for example. The right to life, in 
some constructions, can be forfeited. Divergent national frameworks regarding 
capital punishment could therefore be asserted and retained even while retentionist 
states accept the broader international human rights system. 
Settling. What inhibits settling of TLO norms? In the case of the death penalty, 
transnational norms are neither ambiguous nor indeterminate: capital punishment 
is framed as a violation of the most fundamental human right, the right to life. 
Settling of this norm is incomplete because it is in direct collision with national or 
local norms that see capital punishment as justified or even necessary to defend 
social order or national security. The norm of abolition has settled in much of the 
world but it remains contested, especially in some regions (Middle East and North 
Africa, Asia). 
Concordance. We observe considerable concordance at the regional and 
domestic levels in some parts of the world (Europe, Oceania, and Latin America) 
143 Frank Schwartz, Civil Society in Japan Reconsidered, 3 JAPANESE J. OF POL. SCI. 195, 203–04 (2002). 
144 See IAN NEARY, HUMAN RIGHTS IN JAPAN, SOUTH KOREA, AND TAIWAN 66 (2002). 
145 See MIKA OBARA-MINNITT, JAPANESE MORATORIUM ON THE DEATH PENALTY 110 (2016); 
Roger Hood & Carolyn Hoyle, Abolishing the Death Penalty Worldwide: The Impact of a ‘New Dynamic,’ 38 
CRIME AND JUST. 1, 29 (2009). 
146 Ely Aaronson and Gregory Shaffer, conference framework paper on file. 
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but with continuing gaps in others. The variation is mainly across countries and 
regions.
State power. The death penalty TLO has not been driven by powerful states 
seeking to impose their conceptions of criminal justice on others. In fact, several of 
the most powerful states (the United States, China) remain among the leading 
resisters to the TLO. At the international level, in the drafting of key instruments 
like the UDHR, the ICCPR, and its Second Optional Protocol, the policy 
entrepreneurs tended to represent small and midsized states, often from Latin 
America and Western Europe. 
Data power. Data and information on the death penalty have been collected and 
disseminated largely by INGOs at the heart of transnational human rights networks: 
AI and HRW. Even so, the ongoing dynamics of abolition and resistance are not 
driven primarily by differing quantitative or qualitative assessments of capital 
punishment, but rather by divergent underlying values. 
The transnational legal ordering of capital punishment remains uneven, with 
significant parts of the world remaining outside its reach. As shown above, countries 
in the Middle East, North Africa, and much of Asia have largely retained the death 
penalty. Moreover, some of the world’s largest countries continue not just to keep 
the death penalty on the books but to carry it out: China (the world leader in 
executions), the United States, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, and Nigeria. In 
this light, the transnational legal ordering of the de3ath penalty may well have 
reached a point at which its further extension is unlikely. In the current climate of 
populist authoritarianism, some retreat may even be possible. 
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APPENDIX
Table A
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Democracy 1.091 0.882 2.027 2.408 0.336 0.246 0.404 0.514
(1.057) (0.897) (2.184) (2.913) (0.457) (0.343) (0.567) (0.668)
Proportional 
representation
4.190*** 4.146*** 3.282*** 3.203*** 4.095*** 4.357*** 3.696*** 2.430**
(1.546) (1.539) (1.199) (1.197) (1.857) (1.891) (1.728) (0.949)
Judicial independence 1.9 1.87 0.688 1.412 6.571* 8.790** 7.039* 3.064
(1.650) (1.639) (0.725) (1.286) (6.389) (9.024) (7.019) (3.214)
INGO country-
specific "hits"
1.208*** 1.209*** 1.252*** 1.215*** 1.241*** 1.249*** 1.242*** 1.187***
(0.051) (0.052) (0.057) (0.059) (0.075) (0.079) (0.075) (0.062)
Prior abolition for 
ordinary crimes
3.930*** 3.743*** 4.927*** 3.909*** 3.934*** 4.381*** 3.991*** 4.171***
(1.485) (1.385) (1.739) (1.562) (2.003) (2.330) (2.038) (2.023)
Population (ln) 0.809** 0.804** 0.747*** 0.807* 0.825 0.852 0.817 0.962
(0.084) (0.082) (0.076) (0.090) (0.129) (0.136) (0.127) (0.125)
1970s 2.314 2.314 2.364 0.715
(2.361) (2.357) (2.232) (0.520)
1980s 5.307 5.384 4.983 1.54 1.099
(5.653) (5.802) (5.335) (0.870) (0.717)
1990s 18.884* 19.240* 19.699* 4.129** 6.860*** 6.529*** 6.346*** 3.877**
(17.413) (17.877) (18.191) (2.326) (4.139) (3.725) (3.788) (2.583)
2000s 4.858 4.848 5.022
(4.937) (4.954) (4.984)
Western Europe 5.981*** 6.490*** 3.124 5.574*** 7.607** 5.914** 7.321** 6.513**
(3.543) (3.892) (2.316) (3.471) (6.444) (5.250) (6.391) (4.758)
CEE & ex-USSR 6.903*** 7.317*** 4.100** 5.674*** 7.177*** 6.028*** 7.510*** 8.860***
(4.242) (4.507) (2.832) (3.526) (4.818) (4.167) (5.255) (5.712)
Oceania 10.839* 11.754* 6.266* 10.132** 0 0 0 5.528
(9.635) (10.337) (6.105) (8.919) 0 0 0 (7.023)
Latin America 1.369 1.438 0.352 1.353 1.379 1.218 1.39 1.61
(0.838) (0.896) (0.285) (0.863) (1.021) (0.922) (1.062) (1.112)
North America & the 
Caribbean
3.421 3.463 1.614 1.702 0.919 0.666 0.814 1.408
(3.449) (3.515) (1.698) (1.954) (1.508) (1.153) (1.353) (1.938)
Sub-Saharan Africa 5.594*** 5.843*** 2.786* 4.993*** 4.964*** 4.672*** 4.630*** 4.199***
(2.689) (2.869) (1.662) (2.572) (2.538) (2.474) (2.505) (2.262)
Asia 2.748 2.815 2.008 2.516 1.784 1.829 1.796 2.134
(1.943) (2.019) (1.398) (1.836) (1.568) (1.735) (1.609) (1.669)
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